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More Than Just Territorial: The 8th
Circuit Establishes a Resourceful
Precedent in Claiming Jurisdiction
Over Denials to Compel Arbitration
Industrial Wire Products, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As the legal community begins to shift its focus to alternative methods of dis-
pute resolution, many contracts today include mandatory arbitration provisions. 2
Specifically, many businesses require that disputes be resolved through arbitra-
tion, an alternative dispute mechanism, for the purposes of speed, efficiency, and
finality.3 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted by Congress in 1925, go-
verns arbitration agreements.4  Applicable to this note is Section 16(a)(1)(A) of
the FAA, which allows parties who have been granted or denied motions to com-
pel arbitration to appeal that decision.5 Section 16, however, does not specify to
which court such an appeal should be taken.6 Thus, federal appellate courts, in-
cluding regional circuit courts of appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, have been left to interpret general statutes providing for the courts of ap-
peals' jurisdiction.
This has caused a split in authority as to whether an order compelling or de-
nying a motion to arbitrate falls under exclusive federal circuit appellate jurisdic-
tion or whether the appeal falls under regional appellate court jurisdiction.7 The
Federal Circuit has nationwide, exclusive jurisdiction over specialized areas of
law, such as patent law and administrative law.8 In addition, the Federal Circuit
has jurisdiction over appeals for interlocutory orders granting injunctions.' The
1. 576 F.3d 516 (8th Cir. 2009).
2. See Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the
Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) ("Companies providing a broad range of products and
services are now using small print contracts of adhesion to require their customers, employees, busi-
ness partners, and others to resolve any future disputes through binding arbitration, rather than through
litigation.").
3. Id.; see also Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REv. 265, 265, 269 (1926) (noting that the benefits of arbitration include the avoidance of conges-
tion in the courts, and litigation's slow pace, expense, and technical formalities); Meredith R. Miller,
Contracting out of Process, Contracting out of Corporate Accountability: An Argument Against En-
forcement ofPre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN. L. REv. 365, 373 (2008).
4. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883, 883-86 (1925)
(codified as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A).
6. See 9 U.S.C. § 16.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See the United States Courts of Appeals website available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=144&Itemid=27.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006).
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Federal Circuit considers denials of motions to compel arbitration injunctive in
nature.' 0 In contrast, many circuit courts of appeals do not find denials of motions
to compel arbitration injunctive in nature and conclude that the regional circuit
court of appeals has jurisdiction." Consequently, this has created a lack of un-
iformity among the appellate courts.
This note argues that the Eighth Circuit's decision to claim jurisdiction in In-
dustrial Wire Products, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp. was practical and re-
sourceful, as that court is better suited to decide matters of contract interpretation.
The highly specialized Federal Circuit should devote its time and expertise to
governing cases in particular areas of law, like patent litigation and administrative
law. This note further argues that the Eighth Circuit preserved judicial resources
and adhered to the parties' intentions in holding that the patent infringement
claims were required to proceed through arbitration.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2006 and 2007, Costco Wholesale Corp. (Costco) entered into an agree-
ment with Industrial Wire Products, Inc. (IWP) in which IWP agreed to supply
Costco with IWP's patented "Configurable Bins," a type of interlocking plastic
storage container.12 The 2007 vendor agreement between Costco and IWP con-
tained the following arbitration clause:
27.1 All claims and disputes that (1) are between Vendor (IWP) and
Costco Wholesale ... and (2) arise out of or relate to the agreement doc-
uments or any agreement or transaction or occurrence between Vendor
[IWP] and Costco Wholesale or to their performance or breach (includ-
ing any tort or statutory claim) . . . shall be arbitrated under the Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"),
in English in Seattle, Washington ....
27.2 Vendor [IWP] acknowledges and agrees that . .. this agreement to
arbitrate covers, without limitation, any claims with respect to matters re-
lating to the distribution rights of any of the parties arising under this Im-
port Agreement or any applicable law.'3
Costco subsequently began selling a product called "Interlocking Shoe Orga-
nizer," which Costco purchased from a different vendor.14 "Interlocking Shoe
Organizer" is a storage device product comprised of a series of panels that are
joined with interlocking connectors to produce bins of various shapes and confi-
gurations.' 5 IWP filed suit against Costco in January 2008, alleging patent and
10. See, e.g., Microchip Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 367 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction).
11. See, e.g., Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advance Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2001)
(the Federal Circuit does not have exclusive jurisdiction).
12. Indus. Wire Prods. Inc., v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 576 F.3d 516, 517 (8th Cir. 2009).
13. Id at 517-18.
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trade dress infringement' 6 arising out of Costco's sale of the "Interlocking Shoe
Organizer," as well as violations of Missouri's unfair competition laws.' 7 In re-
sponse, Costco moved to compel arbitration under the parties' vendor agree-
ment.' 8  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1338,19 denied the motion to compel arbitra-
tion.20 The court analyzed paragraph 27.1 of the 2007 vendor agreement and held
that IWP's claims were not arbitrable because they did not arise from the vendor
agreement or any agreement, transaction, or occurrence between the parties.21
The court did not, however, analyze whether IWP's claims were arbitrable under
paragraph 27.2 of the 2007 vendor agreement.22
On June 24, 2008, Costco appealed the decision 23 arguing that paragraph 27.2
covers intellectual property disputes and the refusal to compel arbitration should
be reversed.24 Specifically, Costco contended that paragraph 27.2 covers the right
to distribute products based on provisions within the agreement or "any applicable
law, such as patent law, as asserted in the complaint." 25 The Eighth Circuit found
that the district court was likely correct in its interpretation of paragraph 27.1, but
that the district court erred by failing to analyze paragraph 27.2, which contains
additional language concerning the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.26
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the arbitration clause liberally and, while noting
that it resolves any doubts in favor of arbitration, held that the dispute fell within
the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement and that the district court erred in
denying Costco's motion to compel arbitration.27
The Eighth Circuit also addressed appellate jurisdictional issues, holding that
the district court's decision (denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration)
was not a final decision and thus the appeal did not fall under the exclusive juris-
diction of the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1).28 The Eighth Circuit
further held that the order denying the motion to compel arbitration was not an
"order denying an interlocutory injunction," which would vest the Federal Circuit
Court with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.29 The Eighth Circuit ultimately
16. "[T]rade dress" . . . [is] a category that originally included only the packaging, or 'dressing,' of a
product, but in recent years has been expanded by many courts of appeals to encompass the design of a
product." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
17. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 518.
18. Id.
19. §28 U.S.C § 1338 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.
Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and
copyright cases.").
20. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 518.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 518.
23. The Eighth Circuit held that a notice of interlocutory appeal under § 16 of the FAA divests the
district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case pending appeal. The court granted Costco's
motion to stay litigation pending the appeal. See Indus. Wire Prods., Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
No. 4:08-CV-70 CAS, 2008 WL 2906716, at *1-*2 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2008) (mem.).
24. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 521.
25. Id. (emphasis in original).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 519; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
28. Id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
29. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 519-20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)-(b).
501No. 2]
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stated that its jurisdiction was vested in 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1), which renders the
denial of a motion to compel arbitration appealable, as well as 28 U.S.C. §
1294(1), which provides that an appeal from a reviewable decision of a district
court shall be taken to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district.30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Jurisdiction
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) to promote al-
ternative dispute resolution and court enforcement of arbitration agreements.3 1
Section 4 of the Act allows a party seeking to compel arbitration to file suit solely
for that purpose, or if a lawsuit has already been commenced, to file a motion to
compel arbitration as part of the litigation.32 If a motion to stay litigation or com-
pel arbitration is filed pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, Section 16 of the Act then
provides for interlocutory review of said motions. By allowing interlocutory
review of motions to compel arbitration, Section 16 prevents the litigation process
from hindering arbitration or undermining the advantages of arbitration.34 Section
16(b) prohibits appellate review of interlocutory orders favorable to arbitration,
while Section 16(a) allows for review of an order unfavorable to arbitration.35
Relevant to this note is Section 16(a)(1)(b), which allows interlocutory review of
orders denying a petition to order arbitration to proceed under Section 4.
30. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1); 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(1).
31. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); see also Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 868 (1989); Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 712 F.2d 724, 728 (1st
Cir. 1983); Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertex S.S. Corp., 352 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1965); Rogers v.
Schering Corp., 262 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991 (1959).
33. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 16 provides:
(a) An appeal may be taken from-
(1) an order-
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbi-
tration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be taken from
an interlocutory order-
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
34. See Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision ofAppellate Jurisdiction
over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365, 1372-73 (2002) ("Consistent with the pro-
arbitration approach of the FAA, section 16 sought to facilitate appeals from orders that favored litiga-
tion over arbitration while curtailing immediate review over orders compelling arbitration.").
35. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)-(b).
36. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).
[Vol. 2010502
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In deciding whether to hear an appeal, an appellate court must first determine
whether it has jurisdiction.3 7 To make this decision, federal appellate courts look
to statutory law governing federal appellate jurisdiction, specifically 28 U.S.C. §§
1291, 1292, 1294, and 1295. These statutes generally characterize arbitration
orders as either "final," "interlocutory," or "collateral."3 ' 28 U.S.C.§ 1292(a)(1)
confers jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders of U.S. district courts
granting or denying injunctions.40 Section 1292(a)(1)'s application can often be a
source of confusion for appellate courts in determining jurisdiction.41 Specifical-
ly, courts have historically disagreed as to whether orders compelling or denying
arbitration in ongoing proceedings under Section 4 are considered injunctions for
the purposes of jurisdiction under Section 1292(a)(1). 42 If the interlocutory order
is found to be injunctive in nature, then under Section 1292(c), the Federal Circuit
will have exclusive jurisdiction.43 The ultimate decision as to whether an order is
injunctive is important because it affects whether the appeal goes to a circuit court
of appeals or the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) is unique among the
thirteen circuit courts of appeals because it has nationwide jurisdiction in various
subject areas." Much like any other circuit court of appeals, many of the Federal
Circuit's appeals come from the district courts. However, the Federal Circuit is
different in that it is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over ap eals relating to
specialized areas of law like patent law and administrative law.4  All appeals in
patent infringement suits from district courts go directly to the Federal Circuit
37. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1152 (1lth Cir. 1999), rev'd in part, 531
U.S. 79 (2000).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (allowing courts of appeals to have jurisdiction from final decisions of
district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (allowing courts of appeals to have jurisdiction from interlocutory
orders of district courts); 28 U.S.C § 1294 (specifying circuit court of appeals in which appeals from
reviewable decisions of district courts can be taken); and 28 U.S.C § 1295 (2006) (specifying jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
39. Edith H. Jones, Appeals ofArbitration Orders: Coming out of the Serbonian Bog, 31 S. TEx. L.
REV. 361, 365 (1990).
40. § 1292(a) reads:
[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) [i]nterlocutory orders of the
district courts of the United States ... or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court ....
§ 1292(a).
41. See Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advance Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 F.3d 44, 52-53 (3d Cir.
2001)52-53 (an appeal from a district court order denying a motion to stay a patent infringement suit is
not appealable as an interlocutory injunction under Section 1292); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Wes-
tinghouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1988) (a district court's order denying a motion to
compel arbitration has an injunctive effect and is appealable under Section 1292 as an interlocutory
order).
42. See supra note 42.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) (2006):
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction-
(1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in subsection (a) or (b) of this
section in any case over which the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295
of this title ....
44. See the United States Courts of Appeals website available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php?option-com-content&view-article&id=144&Itemid=27.
45. Id. ("The court's jurisdiction consists of administrative law cases (55%), intellectual property
cases (31%), and cases involving money damages against the United States government (11%).").
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Court of Appeals. 46 Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 out of the grow-
ing need to promote technology, divide labor and caseloads, and the realization
that the federal system, prior to the Federal Circuit, was hostile towards patent
law.47 The Federal Circuit was also created in part to make judges with a back-
ground or expertise in patent law available in patent cases.48 Essentially, having a
judge with expertise in patent infringement law ensures fairness to both parties
49
and conserves judicial resources.
Cases appealing the merits of a patent dispute are undoubtedly appropriate in
the Federal Circuit. However, many cases like Industrial Wire, with underlying
patent claims, leave the appellate court system to dispute whether the circuit court
of appeals or the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction.o In the instant case, the Eighth
Circuit was faced with the challenge of deciding whether an order denying a mo-
tion to compel arbitration qualified as an injunction under Section 1292(a), in light
of the split of authority among the circuit courts of appeal, as well as the Federal
Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit, for example, has viewed orders compelling or denying
arbitration as injunctions for the purposes of appeals under 1292(a)(1).12 In two
cases, the Fourth Circuit stated that the denial of a motion to compel arbitration
had the practical effect of the denial of an injunction, in that refusing to give the
arbitration agreement full effect could cause serious damage or irreparable harm
to the parties under 1292(a)(1)."
Federal Circuit precedent falls in line with the Fourth Circuit. The Federal
Circuit determined in Microchip Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Phillips Corp., that orders
compelling arbitration are, in effect, mandatory injunctions and thus, the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.54 On appeal, after the district court denied Phil-
lips' motion to compel arbitration, the Federal Circuit began by examining rele-
vant appellate jurisdiction law.ss The Federal Circuit looked to Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court where the Court held
46. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988).
47. Id. at 813; see also Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745,
745(198 1) ("The fact that judicial resources are scarce, and cannot be expanded infinitely, presents a
familiar problem: how to make the best use of a limited commodity. Economic theory provides a
typical answer: division of labor through specialization of the court system."); Richard A. Posner, Will
the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the
Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761, 776 (1983).
48. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1989); see also Sarange Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A
Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REv. 1267, 1267-69 (2005) (discussing the
advantages in granting appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction in complex areas of law, including reduc-
ing the caseload burden on other appellate courts, enhancing the quality of decisions, and enhancing
unity of decisions).
49. Damle, supra note 48, at 1268-69.
50. See, e.g., Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advance Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 F.3d 44, 51-53 (3d Cir.
2001).
51. Indus. Wire Prods., Inc., v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 576 F.3d 516, 519-20 (8th Cir. 2009).
52. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1988).
53. See J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1988);
Kansas Gas & Elec., 861 F.2d at 422.
54. 367 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 1354.
504 [Vol. 2010
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that an order compelling arbitration is essentially a mandatory injunction.5 6 After
determining the order was injunctive in nature, the Federal Circuit cited
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that an "order that has the practical effect of granting or denying an
injunction" would only be appealable under Section 1292(a)(1) if it had a "se-
rious, perhaps irreparable, consequence."5 The Federal Circuit noted that prior to
the congressional enactment of Section 16 of the FAA, "some regional circuits
concluded that the denial of an order to compel arbitration did not have such con-
sequences."ss The enactment of Section 16 resolved this problem by providing for
interlocutory review of grants or denials of motions to compel,59 thereby allowing
the Federal Circuit in Microchip Technology to hold that it had exclusive jurisdic-
tion under Section 1292(a)(1).6 o
Several circuit courts have agreed in part with the Fourth Circuit, holding that
orders compelling or denying arbitration do resemble injunctions, but are not ap-
pealable under Section 1292(a)(1). 6 ' For example, the Seventh Circuit has held
that though orders to arbitrate do resemble mandatory injunctions, they are more
akin to procedural errors and thus, are not appealable under Section 1292(a)( 1).62
On the other end of the spectrum is the Third Circuit's opinion, holding that
the Federal Circuit does not possess exclusive jurisdiction over interlocutory ap-
peals. In Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., the
Third Circuit held that its jurisdiction was vested in 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1),63 which
granted jurisdiction to the regional circuit court of appeals for that district.64 In
that case, Advanced Cardiovascular Systems sought a motion for a stay of patent
infringement litigation pending arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C § 3.65 The district
court denied the motion and an appeal was brought before the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals.66 The Third Circuit specifically denied that the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1), which incorpo-
rates Section 1292(a) by reference. The court reasoned that its decision was in
harmony with the weight of authority.68
56. Microchip Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 367 F.3d 1350, 1354 (citing Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 212 (1962)).
57. Id. at 1354-55 (citing Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 287-88
(1988)).
58. Id. at 1355.
59. See 9 U.S.C. § 16.
60. Microchip Tech. Inc., 367 F.3d at 1354.
61. See, e.g., In re Hops Antitrust Litigation, 832 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987); Matterhorn, Inc. v.
NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 1985); Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc.,
712 F.2d 724, 729 (1st Cir. 1983) and Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 86
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
62. Matterhorn, Inc., 763 F.2d at 870.
63. § 1294 (2006) states: "[A]ppeals from reviewable decisions of the district court ... shall be
taken to the court of appeals.. . .(1) ... for the circuit embracing the district."
64. Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advance Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 F.3d 44, 51-53 (3d Cir. 2001).
65. Id. at 48; see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 ("Stay of Proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitra-
tion.").
66. Medtronic A VE, Inc., 247 F.3d at 48.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 52 (citing McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int'l Co., 105 F.3d 1192, 1193-94
(8th Cir. 1997) and Cofab, Inc. v. Philadelphia Joint Bd., 141 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1998)).
No. 2]) 505
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B. Decision on the Merits
Congress enacted the FAA to provide parties that have agreed to arbitrate
with speedy arbitration, free of undue delay or obstruction of the courts.69 Accor-
dingly, the FAA limits the district court's role in a challenge to an arbitration
agreement to deciding whether "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith" is at issue.7o As to whether the "making of the
agreement for arbitration" is at issue, the Eighth Circuit asks two questions: 1)
whether the agreement for arbitration was validly made; and 2) whether the arbi-
tration agreement applies to the dispute at hand, i.e., whether the dispute falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.7 1 Like Industrial Wire, Medcam
Inc. v. MCNC involved a dispute not as to whether the arbitration agreement was
validly made, but as to whether Medcam's claims fell within the scope of the arbi-
tration clause.72 Medcam entered into an agreement with MCNC that restricted
the parties' ability to transfer medical technology and compete for a period of two
years after the termination of the agreement.7 3 The trial court granted Medcam's
motion to compel arbitration, and on appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision.74 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the arbitration clause of
the agreement was susceptible to an interpretation that encompassed Medcam's
claims.75 Eighth Circuit precedent supports a liberal interpretation of arbitration
agreements, "with any doubts resolved in favor of arbitration." The court in
Medcam rationalized its decision by stating that an order compelling arbitration
"should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbi-
tration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dis-
pute."n Whether the dispute is within the scope of arbitration is decided by apply-
ing the "federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the [FAA] .,,78 The Supreme Court, in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., first established that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration.79 In Moses H. Cone, a contractor sought to
compel arbitration under the FAA in its dispute with a hospital.80 After the U.S.
69. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
70. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
71. Medcam Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972, 974 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp., 334 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31
F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994)); Twin City Monorail, Inc. v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 728 F.2d 1069,
1072 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that arbitration is a matter of contract law and that, absent an arbitration
agreement regarding the particular dispute, a party may not be required to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion) (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
72. Medcam Inc., 414 F.3d at 975.
73. Id. at 974. Specifically, the agreement provided for "[a]ll disputes, controversies or differences
arising out ofor in connection with this Agreement." Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 976.
7 5. Id.
76. Id. at 975 (citing Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak House, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 2001)).
77. Medcam Inc., 414 F.3d at 975 (quoting Lyster, 239 F. 3d at 945 (internal citations omitted)).
78. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 614, 626 (1985) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
79. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,489 (1987).
80. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 4.
506 [Vol. 2010
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District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied arbitration pending
disposition of the state action, the contractor appealed.8 ' On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for entry
of an order to arbitrate. 82 The U.S. Supreme Court then took the case on certiorari
to decide whether the court of appeals acted within its discretion.8 3 The Supreme
Court found that the court of appeals acted within its authority "in order to facili-
tate the prompt arbitration that Congress had envisaged."" The Court recognized
that the policy of the FAA requires a liberal reading of arbitration agreements.8 5
The Court also recognized Congress' intent behind the FAA to move parties to an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly as possible.86 Moses
H. Cone laid the foundation for the current policy of promoting arbitration when-
ever possible. Specifically, arbitration should be promoted with respect to doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues in the court systems, regardless of
whether the issue pertains to an arbitrability defense or contract language con-
struction.8
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit noted that in a previous non-patent case,
it had already rejected the argument that Section 1292(a)(1) grants jurisdiction to
appellate courts for review of denials of motions to compel arbitration because of
their alleged "injunctive effect."88 The Eighth Circuit held that because the order
was neither injunctive nor final, the Federal Circuit did not have exclusive juris-
diction over the appeal.89 Left to find a basis for its jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit
followed the reasoning set forth by the Third Circuit in Medtronic A VE, Inc. v.
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.90 The Eighth Circuit stated that it had
jurisdiction under Section 1294(1), which provides that "an appeal from a review-
able decision of a district court shall be taken to the court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the district."9' In addition, the court relied on 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1),
which renders the denial of a motion to compel arbitration appealable. 92
After the district court denied Costco's motion to compel arbitration and the
Eighth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction under Section 1294(1), the court
turned to deciding the merits of the case and reviewing the denial de novo, based
81. Id. at 7-8.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id. at 24.
86. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22.
87. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) ("Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for resolu-
tion of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."); Moses H. Cone, 460
U.S. at 24-25.
88. Indus. Wire Prods., Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 576 F.3d 516, 520 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int'l Co., 105 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1997)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1).
92. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520; see also 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(1).
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on contract interpretation.93 The Eighth Circuit did not expressly reject the district
court's reasons for denying the motion, but instead pointed out that the district
court failed to address and analyze the second paragraph of the relevant arbitration
provision.94 The Eighth Circuit interpreted the second paragraph, which was not
analyzed by the lower court, as allowing for arbitration of patent disputes. 95 The
second paragraph used additional language to describe what was covered by the
agreement, including the use of the term "distribution rights" as well as the phrase
"any applicable law."96 The Eighth Circuit supported the district court's analysis
of the first paragraph, but pointed out that the lower court failed to analyze the
additional relevant arbitration provisions that were specifically cited by Costco in
its memorandum in support of its motions.97 The Eighth Circuit first looked to
Webster's definition of "distribution" and found that IWP's infringement claim
could reasonably relate to Costco's right to distribute.98 The Eighth Circuit also
relied heavily on its precedent in Medcam,99 and found that because the provision
was ambiguous, and any doubts in contract interpretation are resolved in favor of
arbitration, the arbitration clause covered the patent infringement issue at hand.100
V. COMMENT
A. Jurisdiction
In the present case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit resolved
uncertainty as to two different issues. First, which federal court of appeals had
jurisdiction over an appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration;
second, under what authority that court was vested with jurisdiction.o' Addition-
ally, the court included the patent infringement claim as arbitrable by broadly
interpreting the parties' contract provision.102 The parties' contract provision, as
discussed above, called for arbitration with respect to matters relating to the dis-
tribution rights of any of the parties.1 03 This decision maintained the policy goals
of Section 16 of the FAA and followed Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit
precedent. 104
Courts have historically been divided with regard to interpreting and classify-
ing orders to compel or deny arbitration. 05 Although the Eighth Circuit has pre-
93. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520-21.
94. Id. at 521.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 520-21.
98. Id. at 521 (The Court looked to the definition of distribution provided in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary: "distribution" means the "marketing or merchandising of commodities").
99. Medcam Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that Medcam's claims fell
within the scope of the arbitration agreement because the scope of the arbitration agreement is given a
liberal interpretation and any doubts in contract interpretation are resolved in favor of arbitration).
100. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 521.
101. See id. at 520-21.
102. Id. at 521.
103. Id.
104. See id.; see also Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
105. See supra Part HI.A.
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viously noted that it does not consider motions to compel arbitration as having
"injunctive effect,"l 06 this was the first case in which the Eighth Circuit expressly
declared its appellate jurisdiction over these motions, stating its power is vested in
both Section 1294(1) and 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(1). 0 7 The court looked to its
previous analysis in McLaughlin Gormely King Co., in which it discussed the idea
that a motion to stay allows time to resolve the arbitration dispute and does not
constitute an injunction.'0o In actuality, that resolution process furthers the effi-
ciency and process of the litigation and/or arbitration.109 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
found neither it, nor the Federal Circuit, had appellate jurisdiction from a final or
interlocutory order. 1 o Therefore,' after ruling out the other sources of appellate
jurisdiction described above, the Eighth Circuit was left to find jurisdiction within
Section 1294(l).'11
The decision to keep questions of arbitrability on appeal within the regional
appellate circuit court put any uncertainty surrounding this jurisdictional issue to
rest. The Eighth Circuit was, therefore, left to rely on this decision in the future
for guidance. This case will also provide clarity for future cases, similar to this
one, that involve both underlying federal circuit subject matter, like patent in-
fringement, and arbitration provisions. To prevent confusion, the court properly
distinguished between the underlying merits of the case concerning patent in-
fringement, and the contract interpretation issue on appeal.1 12
The Eighth Circuit rationalized its jurisdictional decision by following the
Third Circuit's reasoning in Medtronic.113 The court stated that the outcome was
practical, due to the fact that the court's purpose on appeal was to decide the issue
of arbitrability and contract validity, rather than patent law.' 14 Given that the
Eighth Circuit would not decide any issues of patent law on appeal, or any speci-
fied law in which the Federal Circuit maintains its expertise, the Eighth Circuit's
argument made sense from a policy perspective. Had the Eighth Circuit taken the
case on appeal and subsequently decided issues wholly reserved for the Federal
Circuit, such as patent law, the court's argument of practicality would fail and the
outcome could potentially have been harmful for both parties.' 15 However, if the
Federal Circuit would apply regional, circuit law to questions of arbitrability while
considering the case on appeal, why burden the Federal Circuit with a matter that
would be a better fit for the regional circuit courts?
A strong argument can be made that the Federal Circuit would be better
suited to spend its limited time deciding matters within its expertise." 6 Designat-
106. See McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int'l Co., 105 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1997).
107. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520.
108. Id.
109. See McLaughlin Gormley King Co., 105 F.3d at 1193.
110. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 520 n.4.
113. Id. at 520.
114. Id. at 520 n.4.
115. See Marion M. Lim, ADR of Patent Disputes: A Customized Prescription, Not an Over-The-
Counter Remedy, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 161 (2004).
116. Patent appeals, an area reserved exclusively for the Federal Circuit, are extremely complex and
lengthy appeals and the court should focus on providing quicker patent appeals rather than take on new
subject areas, like contract interpretation. For example, advocates of giving the Federal Circuit discre-
tion over whether to hear an interlocutory patent litigation appeal state that the pendency of patent
No. 2] 509
11
Marshall: Marshall: More than Just Territorial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ing arbitration orders as interlocutory appeals would give the Federal Circuit ju-
risdiction and burden the circuit with contract interpretation. Allowing the Feder-
al Circuit to decide matters relating to contract interpretation is problematic be-
cause the Federal Circuit could and should be investing its time and energy in
other complex matters."'
In 2007, Congress considered a patent reform bill that would grant the Feder-
al Circuit jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of patent claim construction rul-
ings from the district court level." 8 Chief Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit
wrote to Congress on behalf of the Federal Circuit expressing his concern that this
grant of jurisdiction would overburden the appellate court and prove to be unfeas-
ible in the long term." 9 Chief Judge Michel's response in 2007 supports an infe-
rence that, had the Eighth Circuit established that the Federal Circuit had exclu-
sive jurisdiction in this case, the Federal Circuit ultimately might not have been
capable of handling the subsequently heavier docket. It is also reasonable to con-
clude that if the Federal Circuit were to allow interlocutory appeals, patent claim
construction appeals would likely have priority over arbitration contract interpre-
tation as those appeals are more appropriately decided by the Federal Circuit.120
This could potentially result in arbitration proceedings losing one of their greatest
benefits-quick resolution of disputes.
This outcome also makes sense because it gives the parties involved greater
certainty in predicting the outcome of any contract disputes on appeal.121 The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, faced with the task of applying Eighth Circuit
contract interpretation, may misinterpret the law. This would result in error and
cases on appeal in the Federal Circuit is already too long. See Jonathan W. Parthum et al., Patent
Reform: The Debate Continues into 2010 in PATENT LAW INSTITUE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 378-79 (Patent Law Institute 4th
ed. 2010).
117. See Crissa Cook, Constructive Criticism: Phillips v. A WH Corp. and the Continuing Ambiguity
of Patent Claim Construction Principles, 55 KAN. L. REV. 225, 231-32 (2006) (stating patent claim
construction involves determining the meaning or definition of patent claim terms to determine wheth-
er infringement has occurred) (patent claim construction is a "special occupation, requiring, like all
others, special training or practice."). If patent claim construction requires judges with special know-
ledge relating to patent claim construction, like those in the Federal Circuit, and additionally, the
volume of patent cases on appeal in the Federal Circuit is causing the appeals to become too lengthy, it
reasonably follows that the Federal Circuit is better suited to invest its time in deciding the many
patent cases on appeal rather than contract interpretation issues that could be decided by regional
appellate courts for that district.
118. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 1 10th Cong. § 11(b) (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007,
§1145, 1 10th Cong. §1 l(b) (2007); see also David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 264-65 (2008).
119. Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, to Senators
Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, U.S. Senators, 2 (May 3, 2007), available at
http://www.patentsmatter.com/medialissue/legislation/20070503_Michel.pdf; see also Schwartz, supra
note 118, at 265 n.205.
120. Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, vesting appellate jurisdiction in the court for all
cases arising under the Patent Act. Major goals for this specialized court of appeals include "to pro-
mote uniformity and stability in the interpretation of patent law, to resolve the problems produced by
differing views of regional circuit courts on the value of patents, and to eliminate the resultant forum
shopping." Meredith Martin Addy, Is the Federal Circuit Ready to Accept Plenary Authority for
Patent Appeals?, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 583 (2005) (citations omitted).
121. Clarity and predictability are particularly important in the interpretation of contracts. Keeping
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inconsistency in Federal Circuit Court rulings. If a party involved in an arbitration
dispute knows which appellate court will have jurisdiction over its appeal, that
party can better predict the outcome based on that court's precedent. If a party
can decide whether or not to appeal by taking into account the regional circuit
court of appeals' precedent and style in governing contract validity, that party is
then equipped to make an efficient and financially wise decision when deciding
whether or not to appeal the decision at the district court level.122
B. Decision on the Merits
In interpreting whether the patent infringement suit fell within the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate, the court relied heavily on congressional and federal
intent, including previous U.S. Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit decisions. 2 3
Congress deemed the FAA necessary in order to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts by ending the judiciary's long-standing
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.' 4 Because arbitration is a creature of
contract, the first question a district court should ask is whether the arbitration
agreement is valid. Second, the court should determine whether the dispute falls
within the contract terms.125 The question of whether the parties agreed to arbi-
trate is governed by general contract principles that look to the parties' inten-
tions.126 Whether the dispute is within the scope of arbitration is decided by ap-
plying the "federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the [FAA]." 27 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the FAA as establishing that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.128
The contract provision in this case was given a liberal interpretation, which
falls in line with Eighth Circuit authority. Eighth Circuit authority requires that
any doubts regarding arbitrability be resolved in favor of coverage under the
agreement unless it can be said "with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."1 29 The
Eighth Circuit reasonably believed that, based on the definition of "distribu-
122. "The certainty generated by precedent, as has often been observed, enables citizens to obtain
definite advice on how to order their affairs." NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF
PRECEDENT 160-61 (2008). When courts decide consistently on the same facts they not only provide
us with important information for the purposes of organizing our individual affairs, but also make it
more likely that citizens generally will negotiate the legal system with confidence. Id.
123. See infra notes 125-126.
124. See Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 2003); see
also Miller, supra note 3, at 372 (stating arbitration is a creature of contract); Salley v. Option One
Mortgage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119 (2007) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)).
125. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626.
126. 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:11 (4th ed. 1997).
127. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 614, 626 (1985) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
128. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
129. Indus. Wire Prods., Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 576 F.3d 516, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing Medcam Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2005)).
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tion,',i3o IWP's infringement claims reasonably related to Costco's right to distri-
bute the Interlocking Shoe Organizer, which IWP believed violated its intellectual
property rights.' 3 1 The Eighth Circuit correctly noted that because it had doubts as
to whether the infringement claim fell within the arbitration provision, the provi-
sion should be held to include the claim.132
Despite the Eighth Circuit's failure to expressly state that party intentions
were considered, it can be inferred and is in fact likely, that Industrial Wire and
Costco's intentions at the time of contract formation were considered. This prob-
ably factored into the inclusion of the infringement claim in the agreement.' 3 3 The
contract interpretation was governed by federal law requiring that the parties'
intentions be ascertained and considered at the time of contract interpretation.134
Party intentions are considered because one of the goals of contract law is to en-
sure that parties are able to make arrangements for the future and to assess and
allocate the risk of doing business.'3 5 If the parties originally intended to arbitrate
all disputes for convenience, speed, and financial reasons, it should follow that
they also likely intended the arbitration provision to include patent disputes, which
are notoriously lengthy and extremely expensive.136
Although the court based its decision strictly on arbitrable contract interpreta-
tion precedent,'3 7 it is worth noting that the end result is also potentially favorable
for the parties in terms of saving time and money in a typically lengthy and ex-
pensive patent, infringement suit.13 By having the parties arbitrate the infringe-
130. The Court looked to the definition of distribution provided in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary: "distribution" means the "marketing or merchandising of commodities." Indus. Wire, 576
F.3d at 521.
131. Id.
132. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit stated that paragraph 27.2 "at best, plainly requires arbitration of
IWP's claims" and "at worst the provision is ambiguous and susceptible of an interpretation covering
that covers IWP's claim." Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 521.
133. Paragraph 27.2 of the arbitration agreement between Costco and IWP states that "[IWP] ac-
knowledges and agrees that . . . this agreement to arbitrate covers, without limitation, any claims with
respect to matters relating to the distribution rights of any of the parties arising under this Import
Agreement or any applicable law." Id. at 518. The validity of the arbitration agreement was not at
issue and the Eighth Circuit stated that at worst, this broad language (of paragraph 27.2) was suscepti-
ble of an interpretation covering IWP's claims of infringement. Id. at 521.
134. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. at 614, 626 (1985) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also 7 RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:11 (4th ed. 1997).
135. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.3 (4th ed. 2004) (noting function of contract law
from parties' perspective is "planning for the future"); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER,
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND CONTRACT LAW, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1,
4 (1979) (asserting that a basic function of contract law is to enforce the "agreed-upon allocation of
risk" between parties).
136. See Mike Turner, The Future of the Corroboration Requirement in Patent Law: Why a Clear,
Strict Standard Benefits All, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1319, 1349 (2008). But see Lim, supra note 115, at
181 ("The adversarial nature of the relationship between parties is a defining characteristic of most
patent dispites.").
137. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 521.
138. Aaron Pereira, Licensing Technology to the Brics: The Casefor ADR, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 235, 242-43 (2009) (stating that the relief awarded is often not worth the expense and time of
litigation). Patent litigation is a time-consuming procedure that can often result in lost opportunities
and can last from 1.12-12.3 years after the patent application was filed. Id. In 2005, the American
Intellectual Property Association reported that the average cost (including appeal) of a patent case was
$2 million, trademark litigation was $700,000 and other IP litigation was between $440,000 and $1
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ment claim, this decision is also favorable in that it relieves the overburdened,
specialized Federal Circuit court, which hears patent disputes regularly. The idea
of using alternative dispute resolution, specifically arbitration, to resolve patent
disputes is growing among scholars and the legal community.'3 9 Many scholars
believe that subjecting patent infringement suits to arbitration proceedings would
enhance the U.S. patent system, encourage innovation among inventors, and re-
duce the overhead costs of overburdened federal courts.140 Certain arbitrators are
skilled and knowledgeable in patent law and the use of arbitration in patent law
litigation provides speedy decisions and saves both parties enormous expense.141
Many of the goals of the FAA are also aligned with 35 U.S.C. § 294, which go-
verns patent arbitration. Both aim to give parties the fastest and cheapest alterna-
tive to litigation, while at the same time providing relief to courts.142
The Eighth Circuit's decision to include the infringement claim within the ar-
bitration agreement promoted FAA policies and promoted the idea of using ADR
techniques to resolve current problems in patent litigation, as discussed above.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit's decision to include the infringement claims by
interpreting the arbitration agreement broadly likely represented IWP and Cost-
co's intentions at the time they drafted their arbitration agreement.143 Specifically,
an inference can be drawn that, because the agreement called for distribution dis-
putes to be resolved through arbitration, the parties likely desired to arbitrate intel-
lectual property disputes as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
In spite of the split in authority among the circuit courts of appeals, the Eighth
Circuit provided clarity and predictability in holding that it was vested with juris-
diction over the district court's denial of Costco's motion to compel arbitration.'"
In deciding it was vested with jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C § 16(a)(1) and Section
1294, and in rejecting the "injunctive" theory that the Fourth and Federal Circuit
million. See Taylor, Avoiding Costs of Intellectual Property: Think "Mediation," available at
http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/contributors.asp?id=913 (last visited October 4, 2010); "Expen-
sive expert witnesses are usually required in patent cases. In fact, multiple experts are frequently
necessary to cover the technology, as well as the damages calculations." Patent Litigation: Is it Worth
the Expense?, 26 GENETIC ENG'G & BIOTECH. NEWS 7 (Apr. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/patent-litigation-is-it-worth-the-expense/1454/ (last visited
August 19, 2010).
139. See generally Aaron Pereira, Licensing Technology to the Brics: The Case for ADR, 11
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL 235, 261 (2009) (stating that there has been gradual movement towards
the use of ADR in intellectual property disputes over the last few decades).
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2006); see also Konstantinos Petrakis, The Role of Arbitration in the Field
of Patent Law, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 28-29 (1997) (stating that arbitration of patent disputes would
be quick as it would involve less discovery than litigation and arbitrators are experts in the field of the
dispute, arbitration would cost less than 85% of the cost of litigating the dispute, arbitration is confi-
dential, and arbitration judgments are of high quality as the arbitrator selected can be an expert in the
field of the subject matter of the arbitration).
141. See Petrakis, 388 U.S. at 28-29.
142. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (stating that
Congress, in enacting the FAA, intended for parties who have agreed to arbitrate disputes to do so in a
speedy manner without delay or obstruction by the courts).
143. See supra and accompanying text note 135.
144. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520.
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propose,145 the court denied the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.'1 This case has practical implications, as it gives the regional circuit
court of appeals the ability to consider matters that are more appropriate and effi-
cient for it to decide, such as contract interpretation.
In vesting jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit, the court left the Federal Circuit
with a greater ability to devote its resources and energy to the complex subject
matter within its exclusive jurisdiction. Passing the case to the Federal Circuit
would arguably have wasted the Federal Circuit's resources as the Federal Circuit
would not have been given an opportunity to apply its expertise in patent law to
the dispute at hand, but would have merely applied regional, federal, contract law.
Applying regional, federal, contract law is a task that the Eighth Circuit was better
equipped to handle, given that Eighth Circuit precedent was applied in construing
the arbitration provision between IWP and Costco.
The Eighth Circuit, in liberally construing arbitration provisions to cover dis-
putes, maintained precedent by reversing the district court's decision to exclude
the patent infringement claim from the agreement to arbitrate.14 7 Subjecting the
infringement claim to arbitration was likely in the parties' best interest as it was
probably their intention to resolve all disputes efficiently and to be as financially
conservative as possible. In deciding to vest itself with jurisdiction and liberally
construe IWP and Costco's arbitration agreement, the Eighth Circuit promoted the
conservation of judicial resources. Resolving the parties' infringement dispute
through alternative dispute resolution will likely place a small relief on an already
overburdened judicial system.
ASHLEY MARSHALL
145. See Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1988);
Microchip Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 367 F. 3d 1350, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
146. Indus. Wire, 576 F.3d at 520.
147. Id. at 520-2 1.
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